Remote user authentication has been widely used in the integrated electronic patient record information system (EPRIS) to protect the security and integrity of communication sessions between the login user and the medical server. Recently, Wen 17 presented the user authentication and user anonymity scheme based on the quadratic residues and claimed that his scheme is secure. However, we analyzed Wen's scheme and identified that Wen's scheme is vulnerable to password disclosure attack and does not provide efficiency in password change phase. As a result, in this paper, we propose an enhanced scheme for the integrated EPRIS with the aim to eliminate the weaknesses of Wen's scheme. By comparing the performance with other related schemes, our scheme not only resists several hard security attacks but also retains lower computational and communication costs.
Introduction
The rapid development in information and communication technology makes remote medical and health care services to patients a reality. In the integrated electronic patient record information system (EPRIS), which makes it be possible to share the patients' medical records among medical organizations and aims to help medical physicians and health care workers to rapidly make correct clinical decisions 2, 3, 4, 5, 7, 9, 17, 18 . The patient privacy and communication security of EPRIS are important concerns for the patients to understand how the medical organizations control the use of their personal information and sensitive medical records, such as name, telephone, address, health information, diagnosis records and reports, etc. In EPRIS, the user accesses remote medical server via public channel and i The password of U i S The remote medical server for the EPRIS K The secret key of S , where the bit-length of K is 1024 bits ctr i The counter maintained by U i and S n The number n = pq, where p and q are two large primes maintained by S S K The common session key ⊕ The bitwise XOR operation h(·) A collision free one-way hash function such as SHA-256 16 || The concatenation operation some malicious attackers are considered to be powerful enough to perform various security attacks. Thus a secure authentication scheme is essential to safeguard patient privacy and data integrity for the integrated EPRIS 11, 13, 19 . Recently, many smart card based authentication schemes for integrated EPRIS have been proposed in the literature 7, 8, 17, 18 . Li and Hwang 8 in 2010 proposed a remote user authentication scheme by using smart cards and biometrics. Wu et al. 18 in 2012 presented a secure password authentication scheme based on hashing, exclusive-or and exponential operations. However, Lee et 17 . In 2014, Wen proposed a novel anonymous user authentication scheme based on quadratic residues 1, 15, 20 for the integrated EPRIS and Wen's scheme has several advantages: (1) provision of user anonymity, (2) provision of mutual authentication, (3) provision of session key agreement, (4) prevention of impersonation attack, (5) prevention of password guessing attack, (6) prevention of smart card lost attack, (7) better system performance etc. In this paper, we analyze Wen's authentication scheme for the integrated EPRIS and show that Wen's authentication scheme is because the authentication system imposed a heavy burden on the medical server. Moreover, Wen's authentication scheme does not withstand password disclosure attacks. As a result, we present an enhanced scheme which overcomes the flaws of Wen's scheme and preserves its merits for the integrated EPRIS. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we review Wen's authentication scheme and show its weaknesses in Section 3. The proposed scheme and its security analysis are presented in Section 4 and Section 5, respectively. Section 6 compares the performance of our proposed scheme with other related schemes for the integrated EPRIS. Finally, we conclude the paper in Section 7.
Review of Wen's Scheme
In this section, Wen's user authentication scheme 17 will be briefly reviewed. Moreover, we will show that Wen's scheme is vulnerable to password revelation attacks and inefficiency in changing passwords. There are four phases in Wen's scheme: registration, login, authentication, and password change. For ease of presentation, notations used throughout the paper are summarized in Table 1 .
Registration Phase
In this phase, the user U i registers with the medical server S through a secure channel to be a legal user.
Step 1: U i chooses his/her identity ID i and password pw i and sends the registration request (ID, pw i ) to S .
Step 2: Upon receiving (ID, pw i ) from U i , S verifies the validity of ID i and computes v = h(K ⊕ ID i ).
Step 3: S computes s 1 = h(pw i ||K), s 2 = h(h(pw i ||s 1 )) and N = v ⊕ s 2 and initiates a counter ctr i = 0 for U i . S then creates a record (ID i , ctr i ) in its database.
Step 4: S stores h(·), N, s 1 , ctr i into smart card and sends the smart card to U i via a secure channel.
Login Phase
In this phase, when a legal user wants to login the EPRIS, he/she performs the following steps:
Step 1: U i inserts his/her smart card into the device and inputs identity ID i and password pw i . The smart card computes s 2 = h(h(pw i ||s 1 )) and generates a random number r.
Step 2: The smart card computes ctr i = ctr i + 1, M 1 = (ID i ||N||s 2 ||r||ctr i ) 2 mod n and sends a login request M 1 to S .
Authentication Phase
Upon receiving the login request M 1 from U i , S performs the following steps:
Step 1: S reveals M 1 by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem 1,15,20 with p and q to obtain (ID i , N, s 2 , r, ctr i ). Then S verifies the revealed ctr i with the stored ctr i corresponding to ID i . If ctr i > ctr i , S replaces ctr i with new counter ctr i in its database. Otherwise, S rejects U i 's login request.
Step 2: Step 3: S computes M 2 = h(s 2 ||r||0) and sends it to U i .
Step 4:
If it does not hold, U i stops the session. Otherwise, U i now successfully authenticates S and computes the common session key S K = h(s 2 ||r||1) shared with S for securing future communications.
Password Change Phase
In this phase, the user 
Flaws of Wen's Scheme
In this section, we show that Wen's scheme does not satisfy the key security attribute such as efficiency in password change. Moreover, Wen's scheme is vulnerable to password disclosure attack and lack of system parameter in user's smart card.
Password Disclosure Attacks
In real environments, the user U i may use same identity ID i and password pw i to access various remote medical services for his/her convenience. If a privileged-insider of S can know U i 's password pw i , the privileged-insider may try to use (ID i , pw i ) to impersonate U i login into other medical servers. In registration phase of Wen's scheme, U i registers to S by sending (ID, pw i ). Therefore, U i 's sensitive password pw i will be revealed by the privileged-insider.
Lack of System Parameter in User's Smart Card
In registration phase of Wen's scheme, we observe that the medical server S only stores h(·), N, s 1 and ctr i into U i 's smart card without storing the system parameter n. Consider that U i 's smart card generates a login request M 1 = (ID i ||N||s 2 ||r||ctr i ) 2 mod n and sends M 1 to S during the login phase. However, in fact, U i 's smart card cannot compute M 1 = (ID i ||N||s 2 ||r||ctr i ) 2 mod n without having the system parameter n.
Inefficiency in Password Change
In password change phase of Wen's scheme, we observe that a legal user U i cannot freely change his/her password pw i to a new password pw new by off-line manners. When U i wants to change his/her password pw i to a new password pw new , U i must perform two online steps with S during the password change phase. This flaw may cause a heavy burden on medical server and Wen's scheme has inefficient problem during password change phase.
The Proposed Scheme
This section proposes an enhanced scheme to overcome the weaknesses of Wen's scheme, which keeps the merits of original schemes. In the enhanced scheme, the user can freely change his/her old password with new password by a off-line manner without server assistance. Fig. 1 shows the entire phases of our enhanced scheme for EPRIS.
Registration Phase
Step 1: U i chooses his/her identity ID i and password pw i and computes h(ID i ||pw i ||x), where x is a random number generated by U i . Then U i sends the registration request {ID, h(ID i ||pw i ||x)} to S .
Step 2: Upon receiving {ID, h(ID i ||pw i ||x)} from U i , S verifies the validity of ID i and computes v = h(K ⊕ ID i ).
Step 3: S computes N = v ⊕ h(ID i ||pw i ||x) and initiates a counter ctr i = 0 for U i . S then creates a record (ID i , ctr i ) in its database.
Step 4: S stores h(·), N, ctr i into smart card and sends the smart card to U i via a secure channel.
Step 5: Upon receiving the smart card from S , U i stores x into smart card and U i does not need to remember x after finishing registration phase. Finally, U i 's smart card contains h(·), N, ctr i and x.
Login Phase
In this phase, when a legal user wants to login the EPRIS, he/she must perform the following steps:
Step 1: U i inserts his/her smart card into the device and inputs identity ID i and password pw i . The smart card computes v = N ⊕ h(ID i ||pw i ||x) and generates a random number r, where x is retrieved from its memory space.
Step 2: The smart card computes ctr i = ctr i + 1, M 1 = (ID i ||v ||r||ctr i ) 2 mod n and sends a login request M 1 to S .
Authentication Phase
Step 1: S reveals M 1 by using the Chinese Remainder Theorem with p and q to obtain (ID i , v , r, ctr i ). Then S verifies the revealed ctr i with the stored ctr i corresponding to ID i . If ctr i > ctr i , S replaces ctr i with new counter ctr i in its database. Otherwise, S rejects U i 's login request.
Step 2: If Step 1 holds, S computes v = h(K ⊕ ID i ) and checks if computed v equals received v . If it holds, S now successfully authenticates U i and computes the session key S K = h(v||r||1) shared with U i .
Step 3: S computes M 2 = h(v||r||0) and sends it to U i .
Step 4: 
Replace N with N * Replace x with x new Fig. 1 . The flowchart of our proposed scheme for the integrated EPRIS
Password Change Phase
In 
Security Analysis
In this section, we will analyze the security of the proposed scheme and show that our scheme is secure against the following well-known attacks.
Password disclosure attacks:
In real environments, a privileged-insider may find an opportunity to acquire user's password in registration phase and several schemes cannot resist password disclosure attacks. In the registration phase of our scheme, the user U i sends the registration request {ID, h(ID i ||pw i ||x)} to S via a secure channel, where x is a 128-bit random number and x is unknown to S . To derive the password pw i of the user U i from h(ID i ||pw i ||x), the privileged-insider needs to guess correctly both pw i and x at the same time. We suppose the probability of guessing pw i composed of exact m characters and x composed of exact k bits (in our enhanced scheme, k = 128) is approximately
. This probability is very negligible and the privileged-insider has no feasible way to derive pw i of the user U i in polynomial time. As a result, our enhanced scheme resists the password disclosure attacks.
Stolen smart card attacks: Suppose the user U i 's smart card is lost or stolen and the attacker can retrieve the stored parameters {h(·), N, ctr i , x} from the lost/stolen smart card by launching power analysis attacks 6, 14 . Note that U i 's identity ID i is not stored in smart card and the attacker knows neither ID i nor pw i . If the attacker tries to derive pw i in off-line manner from N and x, the attacker needs to guess both ID i , pw i , and K at the same time. We suppose the probability of guessing ID i composed of exact l characters, pw i composed of exact m characters and K composed of exact j bits (in our enhanced scheme, j = 1024) is approximately 1 2 6l+6m+ j = 1 2 6l+6m+1024 . This probability is also very negligible and the attacker has no feasible way to derive ID i and pw i of the user U i in polynomial time.
Impersonation attacks: An impersonation attack is an attempt by the attacker to generate a legal request of the user or generate a legal response of the medical server and two scenarios are taken into consideration. In Scenario 1:
The attacker may try to modify intercepted messages to impersonate a legal user to login to the medical server. In Scenario 2: The attacker may try to submit faked responses to impersonate a medical server to cheat the login user. We assume the attacker can collect all communication requests {M 1 = (ID i ||v ||r||ctr i ) 2 mod n, M 2 = h(v||r||0)} from the previous session between U i and S . Moreover, we assume that the attacker can learn the values of {h(·), N, ctr i , x} from U i 's smart card.
• Scenario 1: In a new session, the attacker needs to modify the login request message M 1 = (ID i ||v ||r||ctr i ) 2 modn in order to cheat the medical server. However, in our enhanced scheme, the attacker knows neither ID i , pw i nor K. Hence, the attacker cannot compute the value of v = h(ID i ||K) and forge a valid message M 1 = (ID i ||v ||r"||ctr i ") 2 mod n to cheat S , where r" is a random number generated by the attacker and ctr i " = ctri i + 1.
• Scenario 2: Continued to Scenario 1, in a new session, the legal user U i will send the login request = ctr i + 1. If the attacker wants to impersonate the medical server S to cheat user U i , he/she needs to generate a valid response M 2 = h(v ||r new ||1) by knowing the values v and r new , which are concealed in M 1 . Unfortunately, due to the protection of quadratic residue problem 1, 15, 20 , the attacker cannot derive v and r new from M 1 without knowing the secret primes p and q which only kept by the medical server S . Therefore, the server impersonation attack of Scenario 2 can be prevented by our enhanced scheme. Our proposed scheme
User anonymity: User anonymity means that an attacker has no feasible way to identify the user U i from the communication sessions. In the login phase of our enhanced scheme, U i 's real identity ID i is implicitly involved in M 1 , where M 1 = (ID i ||v ||r||ctr i ) 2 mod n. Thus the attacker may attempt to derive ID i from M 1 . However, without knowing the secret primes p and q, the attacker cannot reveal ID i from M 1 due to the protection of quadratic residue problem 1, 15, 20 . On the other hands, the login request M 1 is independent and different in every session since login counter ctr i and random number r are randomly selected and changed in every session. As a result, this dynamic concept provides the property of user anonymity.
User friendly: User friendly means that the user is allowed to change his/her password without server assistance.
This property not only reduces the heavy burden on medical server but also provides convenience at user side. In our enhanced scheme, the user can freely change the original password pw i to a new password pw new at anytime by off-line manners and this makes enhanced scheme user friendly.
Performance Evaluation
In this section, we evaluate the performance of our enhanced scheme with other previous authentication schemes 3, 5, 7, 17 for the integrated EPRIS in terms of computation and communication costs. For convenience to evaluate the computational and communication costs, we define some items as follows. Note that the time complexity of executing one T m is cheaper than traditional one-way hashing function and the time complexity of executing one T r is as efficient as that of modular exponentiation.
• T h : The time of executing a one-way hash function.
• T s : The time of executing a symmetric en/decryption operation.
• T c : The time of executing a Chebyshev chaotic maps operation 10, 11, 12 .
• T m : The time of executing a modular squaring operation.
• T r : The time of executing a square root modulo n.
• C 1 : Computation cost of the user U i .
• C 2 : Computation cost of the medical server S .
• C 3 : Total messages transmitted between U i and S .
• C 4 : Total communication rounds during login and authentication phases.
As shown in Table 2 , we demonstrate the performance comparisons among our enhanced scheme and other previous schemes in case of the login phase and authentication phase 3, 5, 7, 17 . Our enhanced scheme saves one and seven hashing operations than Wen's scheme 17 and Lee et al.'s scheme 7 and our scheme achieves stronger security than Wen's scheme. Although our scheme requires one extra hashing operation, one modular squaring computation and one computation of square root modulo n than Hao et al.'s scheme 3 . Hao et al.'s scheme requires four extra Chebyshev chaotic maps operations and five symmetric encryption/decryption operations. Moreover, our scheme requires three extra hashing operations, one modular squaring computation and one computation of square root modulo n than Jiang et al.'s scheme 5 . Jiang et al.'s scheme also requires six extra Chebyshev chaotic maps operations and three symmetric encryption/decryption operations. In fact, according to the items C 3 and C 4 of our enhanced scheme, it is obvious that the performance of the enhanced scheme is still well suited for the integrated EPRIS.
Conclusions
In this paper, we have demonstrated that Wen's scheme is vulnerable to password disclosure attacks and their scheme has inefficient problem during password change phase. To remedy the aforementioned weaknesses, we have presented an enhancement of Wen's scheme, which overcome the weak features of Wen's scheme for the integrated EPRIS.
